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combatants,” with both the protections 
and restraints implied, and that PMCs, 
along with the state governments, have 
a shared responsibility to conduct the 
war in a way that is consistent with 
command and control accountability�
Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis 
of the reemergence of nonstate actors 
in the implementation of warfare� 
With scholarly credibility and political 
savvy, Eckert displays an understand-
ing of both the past and the present 
as the just war tradition impacts the 
future development of PMCs, offering 
reasonable solutions to the current 
problems posed by the outsourcing of 
war� In applying the jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello modifications to the status 
and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central 
assertion in Outsourcing War makes us 
wonder whether these modifications 
negate the very reasons for using 
PMCs in the first place� This question 
raises even further the critical issue of 
whether it is more important to alter 
PMC practices to align with just war 
principles or to alter just war principles 
to align with PMC practices� Eckert 
seems to advocate a middle course that 
balances the time-honored principles 
of the just war tradition with the 
reality of contemporary PMC practices 
through responsible applications, and 
that balance is one for policy makers, 
academics, and warfighters to debate 
in the outsourcing of war to PMCs�
EDWARD ERWIN
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the 
Great Campaigns, by John T� Kuehn� Santa Bar-
bara, CA: Praeger, 2015� 249 pages� $60�
John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the 
Napoleonic Wars “along principally 
operational lines” (p� xi)� Kuehn claims 
that, of the three levels of war, “the 
one that is least understood and 
written about resides in that always 
uncomfortable middle ground, the 
operational level” (p� x)� He explains 
that he chose the period of the French 
Wars (1792–1815) because they lend 
themselves “particularly well to an 
operational-level analysis” (p� ix)� His 
goal is to provide “something of an 
impressionistic result that suggests the 
operational-level approach adopted here 
illustrates effectively the more esoteric 
concept of operational art—how military 
genius, as best defined by Clausewitz, 
operated in space and time in the un-
certain environment at the operational 
level during the era of a veritable ‘God of 
War’” (p� xi)� In particular, Kuehn, who 
holds the General William Stofft Chair 
for Historical Research at the U�S� Army 
Command and General Staff College, 
maintains that “an operational examina-
tion of Napoleonic campaigns has value 
because so many of their characteristics 
resemble current American military 
thought and practice” (p� 9)�
The book begins with an interesting 
discussion of the evolution of the 
operational art as a level of war to be 
studied� Kuehn provides definitions 
and an explanation of his methodology, 
which is to analyze Napoleonic opera-
tions through the frameworks provided 
by the Soviet school and by James 
Schneider, formerly of the U�S� Army 
Command and General Staff College� 
Successive chapters generally follow the 
chronology of the coalition wars that 
France fought between 1792 and 1815� 
Chapter 3, which covers the War of the 
Second Coalition, examines Russian and 
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French operations in Italy and Switzer-
land but does not include Napoleon’s 
second Italian campaign� Chapter 4 is 
devoted to an interesting study of the 
naval war between Great Britain and 
France, in particular the operational 
art of Admiral Horatio Nelson, which 
is well done� Kuehn concludes his book 
with a very short epilogue that covers 
Napoleon’s last campaigns in 1814 and 
1815� No bibliography is included�
Professor Kuehn makes it very clear that 
his conclusions are not based on archival 
research or a fresh look at the primary 
sources: “[M]ost of the sources used for 
this book are secondary and may appear 
dated with respect to their interpreta-
tions� They are used to get basic facts, 
which at the operational level of war 
are largely established” (p� xi)� His notes 
demonstrate a heavy dependence on Da-
vid Chandler, John Elting, Steven Ross, 
Christopher Duffy, Rory Muir, Gunther 
Rothenberg, and Charles Oman� One 
curious omission is the works on 1806, 
1807, 1809, 1813, and 1814 by the early-
nineteenth-century British staff officer 
Francis Loraine Petre, who provides 
much better operational studies than 
does Chandler� Moreover, only a handful 
of references were drawn from recent 
scholarship by Roger Knight and Alex-
ander Mikaberidze� Completely missing 
from Kuehn’s notes are Huw Davies’s 
groundbreaking 2012 work Wellington’s 
Wars: The Making of a Military Genius, 
which might have persuaded Kuehn that 
his interpretation of Wellington’s way of 
war needed some revision, and John H� 
Gill’s three volumes on 1809, Thunder 
on the Danube� Conversely, Kuehn 
consulted Gneisenau’s life of Blücher, 
which must be used with extreme 
caution because at times it borders 
on fiction� For example, the Krümper 
system did not produce 150,000 
trained men in three years (p� 175)�
The problem with Professor Kuehn’s 
research is that the “basic facts” these 
dated works provide are the material 
from which he draws his conclusions, 
and they are not always accurate� 
Moreover, the work is replete with 
generalizations and oversimplifications 
that likewise are not always accurate� 
For example, Yorck did not conduct 
“extensive negotiations” with Clausewitz 
in December 1813 (p� 174) but with the 
Russian general Diebitsch; Germany did 
not explode in revolt in early 1813 (p� 
179); and the “ubiquitous Czernicheff 
and his Cossacks” were not responsible 
for the destruction of Girard’s division 
on August 27, 1813 (p� 195)—that was 
the work of Prussian general Hirschfeld’s 
mainly Landwehr (militia) brigade of 
twelve thousand men, supported by 
Czernicheff ’s five Cossack regiments, 
at the battle of Hagelberg� Blücher’s 
army in 1815 was not “a veritable 
Prussian Grande Armée” (p� 209), as 
it lacked any reserves or specialized 
units at the army level, and 75 percent 
of one of its four corps consisted of 
newly raised Landwehr, while another 
corps was 50 percent Landwehr�
This reviewer had hoped that with 
ABC-CLIO’s acquisition of Praeger 
some quality-control measures would 
be introduced to the latter’s publishing 
process; sadly, this has not been the case� 
Although no fault of his, Kuehn’s book is 
in dire need of professional copyediting� 
Misspellings, omissions and commis-
sions in punctuation and capitalization, 
missing diacritical marks and nobiliary 
particles, redundant vocabulary, and 
less-than-clear sentences mar this book� 
Kuehn is not entirely blameless� Minor 
yet irritating errors such as “the army of 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   13 8/7/17   11:58 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/18
 1 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Prussia created by Frederick the Great 
and his father Frederick William II” (p� 
16) undermine the author’s credibility� 
Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also 
known as the Aulic Council” (p� 24); 
they were very different entities�
Maps are an issue as well� The maps in 
this book would have been considered 
archaic fifty years ago; today they are 
abominable and practically illegible— 
a magnifying glass might be of some 
assistance� Any operational study 
depends on good maps to help the 
reader understand the course of the 
campaigns, but this reviewer gave up 
on trying to use this book’s maps�
It is difficult to state where this book 
fits in the massive literature on the 
Napoleonic Wars� This study can be seen 
as an extension of Robert M� Epstein’s 
1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and 
the Emergence of Modern War� Kuehn 
does accomplish his stated goal of 
describing the Napoleonic “campaigns, 
armies, and leaders using the lens of 
operational art” (p� 10)� However, the 
descriptions of the campaigns are not 
detailed enough for any but a Napole-
onic Wars expert to grasp the points that 
Kuehn is trying to make� He admits that 
some will object to his use of twentieth-
century military theory to explain 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
events (p� xi)� Kuehn does have moments 
of brilliance, especially in the chapters 
on the evolution of the operational art 
and the naval duel, as well as the short 
paragraphs he employs to summarize 
his chapters, but in the end an analysis 
based on outdated scholarship provides 
a weak foundation that jeopardizes 
the stability of the entire structure�
MICHAEL V� LEGGIERE
Hunters and Killers, by Norman Polmar and Ed-
ward Whitman� Vol� 2, Anti-submarine Warfare 
from 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016� 272 pages� $49�95�
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is 
the second volume in a comprehensive 
history of the impact of the submarine 
on maritime warfare� Engaging their 
significant expertise in the history of 
naval warfare and military technology 
research and development, authors 
Norman Polmar and Edward Whit-
man chronicle the development and 
employment of the submarine as a 
weapon of war at sea and the result-
ing response by navies to counter 
the effectiveness of the submarine 
through antisubmarine warfare (ASW)� 
This book examines submarine and 
antisubmarine technology, tactics, and 
doctrine chronologically, commencing 
with World War II submarine operations 
in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminat-
ing with twenty-first-century ASW 
concepts and contemporary issues�
This history captures the asymmetry 
between the submarine and antisub-
marine warfare as these two forms of 
maritime warfare competed for tactical 
and operational superiority� The book 
discusses contributions the science and 
technology community made to ASW, 
as well as the actions of operational 
and tactical innovators� The scientists 
and innovators collectively developed 
ASW capabilities that reignited further 
competition between the submarine 
and the ASW operator� The book’s 
chronological approach studies the 
pace and trajectory of evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes in submarine 
operations and antisubmarine warfare by 
explaining the tactical and operational 
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